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CASCO NORTHERN BANK v. JBI
ASSOCIATES: IMPUTED
DISQUALIFICATION FOR MAINE'S
MIGRATORY LAWYER
I.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of law in Maine, as elsewhere in the United States, is
changing. Problems that previously have been considered insignificant are more pronounced because of the increase in the number of
practicing attorneys.' One problem likely to be confronted by
Maine lawyers on an increasing basis is that of determining the appropriateness of representing a party against a former client of the
lawyer or the lawyer's firm. This problem is complicated by today's
competitive job market for lawyers,2 which forces inexperienced
lawyers to switch firms more frequently than in the past.'
While it is a generally accepted axiom that a lawyer cannot represent a party in a similar matter adverse to the lawyer's previous client,4 moving from firm to firm (or from a firm to a solo practice)
raises a number of other questions regarding the transferring or
"migratory" lawyer's responsibilities. Can the lawyer represent interests adverse to the lawyer's former firm's clients if they were not
the lawyer's personal clients? Is the lawyer restricted from opposing
clients of the former firm even if the lawyer can show that he obtained no information relating to the former client while the lawyer
worked at the old firm? If the lawyer is prohibited from representation, are all of the lawyer's new colleagues similarly disqualified?
Courts throughout the United States have been struggling to find
the "right" answers to these questions for some time. Indeed, since
1. The employment level for lawyers in Maine rose by 66.7% between 1981 and
1987 and has continued to increase throughout the 1990s. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, LEGAL SERVICES 11, 19 (1990). This growth has paralleled national growth
in the legal services industry. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994 407, 410 (114th ed. 1994).
2. Dana Coleman, New Trend" Temp Lawyers, N.J. LAWYER, Jan. 15, 1996, at 1.
3. Alicia Philley. No Guarantees:Despite the ElaboratePainsFirms Take to Nurture Them, More and More Associates are Uprooting Themselves and Seeking Success Elsewhere. They Just Don't Like the Odds, TEx. LAWYER, Nov. 13, 1995, at 29.
4. See ME. BAR R. 3.4(d)(1); Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 850 (1st Cir.
1984) ("The principle is well established that an attorney should be disqualified from
opposing a former client if during his representation of that client he obtained information 'relevant to the controversy at hand.'" (quoting United States v. Ostrer, 597
F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979))); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc. 708 F.2d 1263,
1269 (7th Cir. 1983) ("For a law firm to represent one client today, and the client's
adversary tomorrow in a closely related matter, creates an unsavory appearance of
conflict of interest .... ").
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the mid-1950s numerous cases5 and commentaries6 have addressed
both the policies that underlie certain prohibitions of successive representation and the rules that should guide an attorney's conduct in

such situations.
Only in the last several years, however, has Maine's highest court
been faced with the challenge of determining when a lawyer should
be disqualified from representing a client against a party with whom
the lawyer has a previous connection.7 Most recently, in Casco
Northern Bank v. JBI Associates,8 the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, sitting as the Law Court, unanimously upheld a trial judge's
disqualification of two attorneys who were seeking to represent a
business entity in a suit against the entity's former affiliates. 9 The
court held that due to the nature of the lawyers' connection to the

previous work done on behalf of all of the parties, the lawyers were
now barred from representing one party against the others.10 The
Law Court prohibited the first attorney from representing JBI Asso-

ciates against its former affiliates in a lease dispute because the attorney had participated in the creation of JBI Associates and an

affiliated company that, the court held, was substantially related to
the present matter." The second lawyer was disqualified because
5. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983); Laskey
Bros. of W. Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert denied,
350 U.S. 932 (1956); In re Ferrante, 126 B.R. 642 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991): Satellite Fin.
Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 652 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Del. 1987);
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See
generally Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Proprietyof Law Firm's Representation of
Client in FederalCourt Where Lawyer Affiliated with Firm is DisqualifiedFrom Representing Client, 51 A.L.R FED. 678 (1981) (collecting federal imputed disqualification cases); R. D. Hursh, Annotation, Proprietyand Effect of Attorney Representing
Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 52 A.L1R 2d 1243 (1957) (collecting successive conflict of interest disqualification cases).
6. See Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit. A Bad
Move in Pursuitof an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MN. L. REv. 227 (1987); Howard M.
Liebman, The ChangingLaw of Disqualification:The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. Rav. 996 (1979); Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the Disqualified
Lawyer The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. ARK. Lrrnx- Rocx LJ.
37 (1987-88); Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptionsand Intra-FirmScreening:
The New Seventh CircuitApproach to Vicarious Disqualificationof Litigation Counsel, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 399 (1984); Developments in the Law: Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L REv. 1244 (1981)[hereinafter Harvard
Note]; Karen A. Haase, Note, You Can Check Out Anytime You Like But You Can
Never Leave: Attorney Conflict of Interest and Imputed Disqualification Under Nebraska's New Bright Line Rule, 74 NEB. L Rv. 137 (1995).
7. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me. 1995); Adam v. Macdonald
Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461 (Me. 1994).
8. 667 A.2d 856.
9. Id. at 861.
10. Id. at 860-61.
11. Id.
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he previously had been associated with the first lawyer and so was
presumed to have received the same confidential information."2
When determining whether a lawyer's current representation is
adverse to a prior representation most courts have utilized the "substantial relationship" test.' 3 There is much less agreement regarding
when the possession of confidential information should be imputed
to the attorney's former or present colleagues. Part II of this Note
will examine several approaches that courts have taken in ruling on
"imputed" or "vicarious" disqualification motions. It then will explain how Maine's treatment of imputed disqualification follows or
differs from other approaches. Part III will discuss the facts of JBI
Associates and describe the Law Court's reasoning in upholding the
disqualifications. Finally, Part IV will explain the possible ramifications of the Law Court's decision and suggest how its negative consequences may be avoided.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Substantial Relationship Test

Before any disqualification can be imputed, there must be a lawyer who is ineligible based on individualized grounds. One basis for
disqualification, the basis considered in JBI Associates, is the prohibition on subsequent adverse representation. The rule that lawyers
may not represent clients in related matters to the detriment of their
former client is derived from an attorney's duty of loyalty to the
client.' 4 "For lawyers, the conflict of interest prohibitions flowing
from general agency law are enhanced by the special fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Any influence that might interfere with a lawyer's devotion to a client's 15
welfare potentially
constitutes a conflict with that client's interest.'
12. Id. at 861.
13. See infra part II.A.
14. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 860. See also T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("A lawyer's duty of
absolute loyalty to his client's interests does not end with his retainer."); In re Corn
Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008
(1985):
The duty of loyalty does not always detach when the representation ends.
A client has an expectation that the attorney will diligently pursue his goals
until the matter is completely resolved, absent an effective waiver. In litigation, an attorney may not abandon his client and take a[n] adverse position in the same case. This is not merely a matter of revealing or using the
client's confidences and secrets, but of a duty of continuing loyalty to the
client.
Id at 161.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8 introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
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Although the prohibition of subsequent adverse representation

finds its origin in the law of fiduciary duty and the attorney's status
as an agent,1 6 the primary test used by courts in determining when
the prohibition applies is found in Judge Weinfeld's seminal opinion,
T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures.17 Judge Weinfeld's

"substantial relationship" test states that:

[W]here any substantial relationship can be shown between
the subject matter of a former representation and that of a
subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be
prohibited....
[T]he former client need show no more than that the
[..
matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his former
attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substantially
related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney
previously represented him, the former client. The Court will
assume that during the course of the former representation
bearing on the subconfidences were disclosed to the attorney
8
ject matter of the representation.'
The American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility' 9 contains no direct prohibition on successive

adverse representation, but disqualification under the Code is often
considered under Canon 9, providing that "[a] lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety,"2 and Canon 4, stating that
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a
"[a] lawyer
21
client."-

16. See RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1957).
17. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
18. Id. at 268.
19. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are standards set forth by the ABA as guidance for attorney conducL The Model Code, consisting of Canons, Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules, was promulgated in 1969. The Model Rules followed in 1983
and were intended to "clarify the profession's ethical responsibilities in light of
changed conditions" since the Model Code's adoption. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CoNDucr chairperson's introduction (1994). As of 1994, forty-three out of
fifty-one jurisdictions (the states plus the District of Columbia) had adopted some
version of either the Model Code or Model Rules. ABAIBNA LAvYERs' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr § 01:3-4 (1994). Maine initially patterned its own disciplinary rules after the Model Code. See Me. Rptr., 396-400 A.2d LXXI-LXXV. In
1993 Maine revised its conflict of interest provisions, and in doing so, drew inspiration from both the Model Rules and Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers. Maine developed its own rule in several areas, however,
including imputed disqualification. Me. Rptr., 602-617 A.2d CXXIX.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
21. Id. Canon 4. See also id. n.7 ("[A]n attorney must not accept professional
employment against a client or a former client which will, or even may require him
to use confidential information obtained by the attorney in the course of his professional relations with such client regarding the subject matter of the employment."
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The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct address conflicts
of interest regarding former clients in a more direct manner than the
Model Code. Model Rule 1.9(a) incorporates Judge Weinfeld's
"substantially related" test and states: "A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation."'
Maine prohibits subsequent adverse representation under Bar
Rule 3.4(d). 23 Maine's rule goes further than the Model Rules do by
prohibiting representation if any confidential information obtained
during the former representation may be used in the subsequent
representation, even if the matters are not related. In Adam v. Macdonald Page & Co.,2 4 the Law Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's
three-step test for determining whether there is a substantial relationship between prior and present representation:
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of
the scope of the prior legal representation. Second, it must be
determined whether it is reasonable to infer that the confidential information allegedly given would have been to a lawyer
representing a client in those matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that information is relevant to the issues
raised in the litigation pending against the former client.25
Prior to Macdonald Page, Maine's successive representation rule
was applied by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine in In
re Ferrante.26 In In re Ferrante,the bankruptcy court recognized the
two-pronged approach to disqualification under Maine's successive
representation rule, 27 and found that while the matter under litigation was not substantially related to a previous representation of
(quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 165
(1936))).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUct Rule 1.9(a) (1994).
23. Maine Bar Rule 3.4(d)(1)(i) states:
(d) Conflict of Interest: Successive Representation.
(1) Interests of Former Clients.

(i) Except as permitted by this rule, a lawyer shall not commence
representation adverse to a former client without that client's in-

formed written consent if such new representation is substantially related to the subject matter of the former representation or may involve
the use of confidential information obtained through such former
representation.
ME. BAR R. 3.4(d)(1)(i).
24. 644 A.2d 461 (Me. 1994).
25. Id. at 463 (quoting In re Schraiber, 103 B.R. 1001, 1003 (Bankr. N.D. Il.
1989) (quoting Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186,
195 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc))).
26. 126 B.R. 642 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
27. Id. at 645.
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Ferrante by his present opponent's lawyer,1 there was a likelihood
9
that confidential information had been provided to the lawyer.
Disqualification was not allowed, however, as the court found that
Ferrante had waived any objection to representation by "exhibit[ing] a thorough, knowing and continuing acceptance of [the
opposing lawyer's] representation of [his opponent] against him.""
Jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules do not automatically disqualify a lawyer in possession of confidential information as
does Maine, but subject the lawyer to other rules restricting the use
of such confidential information.3"
B. Imputed Disqualification
1.

In General

The rules that govern lawyer disqualification are sometimes ex32
tended to the lawyers within the firm of the disqualified lawyer.
This concept is termed "imputed disqualification." Imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated lawyers stems from three concerns:
First, [affiliated] lawyers... ordinarily share a common interest in each other's welfare ....If a lawyer's relationship with a
client might create an incentive for the lawyer to violate an
obligation to another client, an affiliated lawyer will often
have the same or a similar incentive to favor one client over
the other. Second, [affiliated] lawyers ... ordinarily have access to files and other confidential information about each
other's clients.... Accidental or purposeful sharing of confidential client information among affiliated lawyers may compromise the representation of that or another client. Third, a
client who is concerned about an abuse of confidential information or other form of disloyalty by the primarily disqualified lawyer often possesses no adequate means of proving that
disloyalty has occurred because of the actions of an affiliated
lawyer.... [I]f a complaining client were required to demonstrate that the lawyer misused confidential information, the
client often would be forced to reveal the very information
whose confidentiality the client seeks to protect. 3
Courts have not been uniform, however, in their treatment of attorneys who change jobs and move to other firms. Generally, courts
28. Id. at 646.
29. Id. at 648.
30. Id. at 649.
31. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules

1.6(a), 1.9(c) (1994)
(general prohibitions on the use of confidential information relating to representation to the detriment of a present or former client).
32. See ME. BAR R. 3.4(b)(3); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10 (1994).
33. RESTATENMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAvYERs § 203 cnt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
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impose two presumptions. First, courts presume that an attorney
leaving a firm has obtained confidential information regarding that
firm's clients. 4 Second, they presume that the attorney will share
those confidences with the attorney's new firm. 35 Courts, however,
take different views on whether these presumptions are rebuttable.
Many courts allow the first presumption to be rebutted. 6 Thus, a
lawyer hired to oppose a client of the lawyer's former firm may
avoid disqualification by making a showing that the lawyer was not

privy to any confidential information of that client while at the former firm. 37
Courts may be less likely to allow rebuttal of the second presumption. 38 An irrebuttable presumption is justified by the assumption

that a lawyer with confidential information will disclose that information to new colleagues if it will help them. 39 Some courts do al-

34. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983). See Morgan,
supra note 6, at 47 ("Traditionally, what one agent of a firm knows, all members of
the firm are presumed to know.").
35. Cromley v. Board of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 74 (1994). See Liebman, supra note 6, at 1000 ("[T]he guiding rationale [of imputing conflicts of interest] is obviously one of avoiding even an appearance of impropriety, the fear being that the lawyer could have revealed previously acquired
confidences to his new partners and associates, inadvertently or otherwise. In fact,
there is a presumption that he did so.").
36. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754
(2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros. of W.Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824.827 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
37. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d at 75354:
It is unquestionably true that in the course of their work at large law firms,
associates are entrusted with the confidences of some of their clients. But
it would be absurd to conclude that immediately upon their entry on duty
they become the recipients of knowledge as to the names of all the firm's
clients, the contents of all files relating to such clients, and all confidential
disclosures by client officers or employees to any lawyer in the firm.
38. NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1976); State ex rel.
FirsTier Bank v. Buckley, 503 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Neb. 1993). But see LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing rebuttal of
presumption that confidential information was shared with new firm); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d at 754 (allowing rebuttal
of presumption that confidential information was shared with new firm).
39. See Harvard Note, supra note 6:
From the moment an attorney has reason to expect that he will represent
a client in a matter to which the confidences and secrets of one of his present affiliate's former clients may be relevant, he has a significant incentive
...to elicit such information deliberately from his colleague. Although the
fellow lawyer need not knowingly cooperate in the sharing of information
(seemingly innocuous questioning or casual examination of relevant files
will suffice), he may have appreciable incentive and opportunity to do so.
The fact of affiliation alone is generally enough to guarantee that there will
be economic, sentimental, and hegemonic ties between the associated lawyers sufficient to induce an affiliate's cooperation with his colleague.
Although such ties might exist even between former affiliates, the
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low this presumption to be rebutted by a showing of institutional
safeguards such as "screening" the "infected" lawyer from colleagues working on the related case. °
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility advises that "[i]f a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from em-

ployment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue
such employment."'" The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
similarly command that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm,

none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by [other
conflicts rules]. ' 42
2. Imputed Disqualification in Maine
The Law Court's decision in JBI Associates was its first ruling on
imputed disqualification. In fact, the court first addressed successive

conflict of interest issues only a year earlier in Adam v. Macdonald
Page & Co. 3 Maine's imputed disqualification rule, adopted in

1993," advises when a lawyer's "taint" that prohibits the lawyer
probability that an attorney will feel free to request his affiliate's sub rosa
assistance and that the affiliate will oblige is plainly greater when the lawyers are presently affiliated. It is this risk of deliberate sharing, customarily
disregarded in the case of former affiliates, that is the distinctive danger of
present affiliation.
Id. at 1361-62 (footnotes omitted).
40. See, eg., Cromley v. Board of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving the use of mechanisms that protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship, including instructing members of the new firm of a ban on exchange of
information with the "infected" attorney, prohibiting access to files and other case
information, locking case files with limited key distribution, installing secret codes to
access information stored on electronic hardware, and prohibiting the sharing of fees
derived from the litigation), cer. denied, 115 S. Ct. 74 (1994).
41. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspONsiBILrry DR 5-105(D) (1980). The
Model Code and Maine's original conflict of interest disciplinary rules used the term
"employment" to refer to the attorney-client relationship. Both the Model Rules
and Maine's revised conflict of interest provisions substituted "representation" for
"employment" to make clear that the provisions apply during any "performance of
professional services as a lawyer for a person or entity toward whom the obligations
of lawyer to client are owed." Me. Rptr., 602-617 A.2d CXXX.
42.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.10(a) (1994).

43. 644 A.2d 461 (Me. 1994).
44. In 1993 Maine revised Bar Rule 3.4 governing conflicts of interest. Prior to
the changes, Rule 3.4 was patterned after the Model Code conflict provisions. The
goal of the revision was to "simplify and clarify ... the abstract language of the
Maine conflict rule [which] frequently made its application to real cases difficult."
Me. Rptr., 602-617 A.2d CXXVIII-CXXIX. Maine's imputed disqualification rule
was not changed substantially, however. Prior to the 1993 revision the general rule
was:
3.4(k) Partners and Associates Barred; Exceptions. If, for reasons other
than health, a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw
from employment under these rules, no partner or associate, and no lawyer
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from representing a client should be attributed to other lawyers:
"[I]f a lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from representation
under these rules for reasons other than health, no partner or associate, and no lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm,
may commence or continue such representation., 45 The manner in
which the trial court applied Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i) to disqualify an attorney was a central issue in JBI Associates.

III.

THE

A.

JBAssocIATES DEcIsiON

The FactualBackground

Community Care Systems, Inc. (CCSI), a developer of healthcare
facilities, engaged Csaplar & Bok, a Boston law firm, as its corporate counsel in 1978. 6 In 1979 CCSI recognized the business potential of building facilities in New Hampshire and Maine.47
Specifically, CCSI was interested in developing a psychiatric facility
in South Portland, Maine. 8 Frederick Goldstein, a partner at
Csaplar & Bok and head of its tax department, advised CCSI and
CCSI's president, Frederick Thacher, in a letter of September 26,
1979, regarding development of the hospital while minimizing the
company's tax and legal consequences. 9 Goldstein suggested that
CCSI create two new business entities: a limited partnership to procure the land and build the hospital facility and a corporate subsidiary to operate the facility.50 Following Goldstein's advice, CCSI
formed JBI Associates Limited Partnership (Associates) and Jackson Brook Institute, Inc. (JBI).' J-BI was incorporated to operate
the hospital while Associates was formed with CCSI as its general
partner to own the facility and lease it to JBI.52
During May of 1983, in a series of concurrent transactions prior to
construction of the facility, Casco Northern Bank agreed to finance
the construction of the facility for Associates, and Associates leased
the facility to JBI. 3 CCSI agreed to act as guarantor for JBI's obliaffiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, may accept or continue such
employment.
Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d CX-CXI.
45. ME.BAR R. 3.4(b)(3)(i).
46. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856, 858 (Me. 1995).
47. Brief of Appellees at 1, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149).
48. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 858.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The similar names of the two entities, JBI Associates and Jackson Brook

Institute, can cause some confusion. This Note will follow the example of the Law
Court which identified JBI Associates as "Associates" and Jackson Brook Institute
as "JBI," the name by which it is familiarly known in the region.
52. Id.
53. Brief of Appellees at 2, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149).
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gations to Associates under the lease.- Associates then assigned
the lease and the guaranty to Casco Northern Bank as assurance for
the loan."5 Thacher was the signatory on all of these documents, as
President of CCSI, Associates, and JBI.5 6 While it is unclear what
role Goldstein played in these 1983 transactions,5 Csaplar
& Bok as
s
a firm represented all three entities during this time.
At about the same time that these transactions were occurring,
Leonard Singer joined Csaplar & Bok as an associate. 59 There is no
indication in the record that Singer did any legal work for CCSI or
its affiliates during his tenure at Csaplar & Bok.
A number of changes affecting the relationships between the parties took place during the mid-1980s. In 1985 CCSI sold its partnership interest in Associates, ending the affiliation between the two
entities.' Also in the mid-1980s Csaplar & Bok ended its representation of CCSI.61 In 1990 Csaplar & Bok merged into another Boston law firm. During that same year, but prior to the merger, both
Goldstein and Singer ended their affiliation with Csaplar & Bok and
joined separate firms.6 2
In 1990 a dispute arose between Associates and JBI regarding the
lease agreement.' Goldstein was involved in resolving this dispute
throughout 1990 and 1991, but the parties again disputed the characterization of his involvement.' CCSI claimed that Goldstein acted
as a mediator who sought to represent the interests of Associates,
CCSI, and JBI.6 5 Associates maintained that Goldstein was hired
by Associates66 to act solely as its representative in the lease dispute
proceedings.
Casco Northern Bank filed suit against Associates, CCSI, and JBI
in November of 1993, alleging that JBI was "upstreaming" funds to
its parent company, CCSI, in violation of the loan and lease agree54. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 858.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Associates claimed that Goldstein had no involvement with CCSI or its affiliates other than his initial letter of advice and played no role in the subsequent lease
arrangement between the parties. Brief of Appellant at 11, Casco N. Bank v. JBI
Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me. 1995) (No. CUM-95-149). JBI and CCSI contended,
however, that Goldstein "was in fact the author of very the [sic] lease at issue" in the
case. Brief of Appellee at 4.
58. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 858.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Brief of Appellant at 3, n.5, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149).
63. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 858.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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ments.6 7 The bank feared that JBI's actions would put the facility at
risk of defaulting on its obligations to Associates under the lease,
which in turn would cause Associates to default on the loan.68
Casco Northern Bank sought a declaratory judgment that JBI was
prohibited from diverting funds to CCSI without Casco's prior writ-

ten approval or, in the alternative, a reformation of the loan documentation. 69 Associates, acting through Goldstein and Singer,
cross-claimed against CCSI and JBI in March of 1994.70

In April of 1994, JBI requested that Goldstein and Singer withdraw from representing Associates because of their prior related
representation of CCSI.71 When the attorneys failed to respond,
JBI filed a motion to disqualify Goldstein and Singer on the ground
JBI in connection with
that they previously represented CCSI and
72
suit.
underlying
the
in
issue
at
lease
the
B.

The Trial Court Decision

The superior court granted JBI's motion and ordered Goldstein
and Singer disqualified from representation of Associates in the
pending lawsuit. 73 The court based this decision on the affidavits of
Thacher, Goldstein, and Singer, as well as affidavits from other interested individuals, and written and oral arguments. 74 The court,
after reciting and explaining the two prongs of Maine's rule prohibiting successive conflicts of interest,7 5 stated that it would apply the
76
three-step analysis adopted by the Law Court in Macdonald Page

to determine whether the prior representation was substantially related to the matters at issue in the pending litigation.7 7 The court

67. Brief of Appellant at 3-4. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149). "Upstreaming" literally refers to the process of transferring funds from a subsidiary to its parent company. In this case Casco Northern
Bank alleged that under the lease and loan agreements entered into in 1983, JBI was
prohibited from upstreaming funds to CCSI without first getting approval from the
bank, thereby ensuring the bank that JBI would retain sufficient reserves to pay the
mortgage loan. JBI and CCSI contended that so long as the loan installments were
paid on a timely basis, Casco Northern Bank had no right to examine the companies'
finances. See generally Record of Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., on file with Cumberland County Courthouse, Portland, Maine.
68. See Brief of Appellant at 4.
69. Id.
70. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 858.
71. Id.
72. Brief of Appellees at 3, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149).
73. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 5-6 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty.,
Feb. 1, 1995) (Bradford, J.).
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. Id. at 4.
76. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
77. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 4-5. In a curious coincidence,
the trial judge in JBI Associates was the same judge assigned to the Macdonald Page
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found "that the involvement of Goldstein in the creation of the psychiatric hospital by CCSI, JBI and Associates was substantially re-

lated to the matters now pending in this litigation," 78 even though

he did not participate in the closing of the lease and regardless of his
role in drafting or negotiating the lease or loan documents.7 9
The court was not persuaded by Associates's contention that
CCSI and JBI had waived their right to object to Goldstein's representation of Associates.' Associates argued that because Goldstein
represented Associates in the negotiations with CCSI and JBI in
1990 and 1991 without objection, CCSI and JBI had waived any con-

flict of interest objection."' The court subsequently disqualified
Singer under Maine's imputed disqualification rule, holding that "if

Goldstein is disqualified then any other attorney who was a member
of the firm at the time would also be disqualified."'

pealed the decision to the Law Court.83

Associates ap-

C. The Law Court Decision

On appeal, Associates challenged Goldstein's disqualification on
a number of grounds. Associates first argued that the trial court's
finding that Goldstein's previous representation of CCSI was substantially related to the pending litigation was clearly erroneous. 84
The Law Court agreed that the "clearly erroneous" standard was
applicable in reviewing orders granting or denying disqualification
litigation, and the parties to the Macdonald Pagesuit were in the courtroom on the
day oral argument on the JBI Associates disqualification motion was heard. Brief of
Appellant at 20 n.12, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me. 1995) (No.

CUM-95-149).
78.
79.
80.
81.

Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 5.
Id
ld. at 6.
See Brief of Appellant at 14-20, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs.. 667 A.2d 856

(Me. 1995) (No. CUM-95-149).

82. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 6.
83. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856,859 (Me. 1995). The Law Court
adopted the position that orders granting or denying motions to disqualify an attorney are immediately appealable. Id. at 859 n.3. The United States Supreme Court
has ruled that such orders are not reviewable as a collateral order exception to the
final judgment rule for appeals in federal courts. Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller,
472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985) (holding that no immediate appeal is available from an
order granting a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case); Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 270 (1984) (ruling that a pretrial order disqualifying defense
counsel in a criminal case is not immediately appealable); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (holding that an order denying a motion to
disqualify counsel in a civil case is not immediately appealable). State courts are
divided on whether rulings on disqualification motions are immediately appealable.
See e.g., Borman v. Borman, 393 N.E.2d 847,852 (Mass. 1979) (allowing immediate
appeal); Allen v. White Drug of Minot, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 279,282 (N.D. 1984) (denying immediate appeal).
84. Brief of Appellant at 8-14, Casco N. Bank v. BI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149).
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of counsel, reasoning that the trial court's "intimate knowledge of
the case helps it to determine not only if the issues are 'substantially
related,' but also assists it in detecting any abuse of the ethical
rules." 5 The Law Court then reiterated its interpretation of the
rule against successive representation established in Macdonald
Page.86 The court held that "[t]here was ample evidence for the
[trial] court to conclude that the work performed by Goldstein in
setting up the two smaller entities, and devising the lease-back plan,
was substantially related to the parties' respective duties under the
lease and loan agreements."' 7 The Law Court found "no error in
the trial court's conclusion that the prior representation was substantially related to the pending litigation." 88
Associates next requested the Law Court to vacate the trial
court's finding that CCSI and JBI had not waived their objection to
Goldstein's representation of Associates. 89 Associates argued that
because the trial court did not set forth the bases for its waiver decision, no deference to its finding was required. 90 Associates urged
the court to follow other jurisdictions in ruling "that (1) if a client
becomes aware that his former attorney is now representing his adversary and (2) if the former client delays in objecting to that representation, the client shall be deemed to have waived the right to
object." 91
The Law Court again applied a deferential standard in reviewing
the trial court's waiver holding.' It held that since there was a dispute over Goldstein's role during the negotiations between the parties in 1990 and 1991, "[t]here was sufficient competent evidence
presented to the court to permit a finding that CCSI and JBI were
unaware of Goldstein's adverse representation until March of 1994
and that therefore there was no waiver of that client's right to
object. ' 93 The court therefore did not reject Associates' proffered
rule regarding waiver; it merely upheld the trial court's finding that
CCSI and JBI had not waived their objection to Goldstein's
representation.9 4
Additionally, Associates asserted that even if Goldstein's previous representation was substantially related to the current litigation,
CCSI and JBI could have no expectation of confidentiality in the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
1995)
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 859.
Id. at 860. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Id.
1L
Brief of Appellant at 14, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
(No. CUM-95-149).
Id. at 14-20.
Id. at 15.
Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861.
Id
Id
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information learned during that representation. 5 Associates relied
on Allegaert v. Perot,9 6 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that in cases involving joint representation, a former client could not expect that its lawyers would withhold
confidences from its co-clients. 7
The Law Court refused to adopt the Allegaert rule, finding it too
narrow to address all of the concerns embodied in Maine Bar Rule
3.4(d)(1)(i):
[T]he rule against subsequent adverse representation goes beyond simply protecting attorney-client communications. The
rule addresses the reasonable expectations of the average client that his attorney, who is both counsellor and confidante,
will remain loyal. The rule protects the integrity of the judicial
system and the public's view of the legal profession; it is necessary to counteract the perception of attorneys as simply "hired
guns," who can and do change sides at will, subject only to the
highest bidder. 98
Associates addressed Singer's disqualification by asserting that
the trial court misapplied the Maine rule of imputed disqualification. 9 Associates argued that the court's holding that "if Goldstein
is disqualified then any other attorney who was a member of the
firm at the time would also be disqualified" ' adds a temporal element not present in Maine's rule. Associates requested the Law
Court to interpret Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i) to allow an attorney with no
present, direct affiliation with a disqualified lawyer to rebut any presumption that client confidences were shared during a previous
affiliation.' 0 '
The Law Court rejected Associates' proposed interpretation of
the imputed disqualification rule.' 02 It held that "[t]here is no room
in [the rule's] language allowing Singer to rebut a presumption that
he was privy to privileged, confidential information. 1 0 3 The court
added that even if Singer were allowed an opportunity to rebut the
presumption, his disqualification would be required for the reasons
supporting the rule against successive representation: "[A] client's
expectations of loyalty, public perception of the legal
profession,
4
and preservation of the integrity of the judiciary.'1'0
95. Brief of Appellant at 20.
96. 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977).
97. Id.at 250.
98. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 860.
99. Brief of Appellant at 22-26.
100. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 6 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty.,
Feb. 1, 1995) (Bradford, J.) (emphasis added).
101. Brief of Appellant at 23.
102. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861.
103. lU.
104. Id.
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DISCUSSION

Goldstein's Disqualification

The primary focus of the JBI Associates decision was the disqualification of Frederick Goldstein, not that of Leonard Singer. 10 5 The
attention given to Goldstein's involvement in this case was natural
given his admitted participation in the prior legal affairs of the parties. In affirming Goldstein's disqualification the Law Court deferred to the trial court's judgment that "[tihere was ample evidence
... to conclude that the work performed by Goldstein in setting up
the two smaller entities, and devising the lease-back plan, was substantially related to the parties' respective duties under the lease
and loan
agreements" that were the subject of the subsequent
10 6
dispute.

The disqualification of Goldstein under Maine Bar Rule
3.4(d)(1)(i) was not factually unreasonable. Although the details of
Goldstein's role in Csaplar & Bok's representation of CCSI and its
affiliates were disputed, the trial court reviewed all of the CCSI documents with which Goldstein concededly had involvement, the loan
and lease documents at issue, and affidavits from the parties, in addition to conducting oral argument. Given that the determination of
whether a substantial relationship exists between a current and prior
representation is a factual question, 107 the trial judge had sufficient
information to make a well-reasoned finding, a finding that the Law
Court did not quarrel with under the clearly erroneous standard of
review.' 08
105. Only two paragraphs of the six-page decision were allotted to analysis of
Singer's disqualification.
106. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 860.
107. Id. at 859. There is some division among jurisdictions as to the standard of
review applicable to orders on disqualification motions. A majority of courts have
adopted the highly deferential "abuse of discretion" standard, reasoning that since
the lower courts have the power and responsibility of supervising the professional
conduct of the attorneys appearing before them, their decision should not be disturbed unless there is no reasonable basis for the determination. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1984). See also Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983); Lowder v. All-Star Mills, Inc., 300
S.E.2d 230, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). Other jurisdictions, including Maine, have
embraced the "clearly erroneous" standard which is only slightly less deferential
than review for abuse of discretion. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 859.
See also United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 827 (11th Cir.) (stating that in criminal cases "[t]he 'abuse of discretion' standard is simply too deferential where such a
fundamental constitutional right [to counsel] is affected"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906
(1982).
108. The manner in which the trial court and the Law Court went about their
decision to disqualify Goldstein is more questionable than the result. The trial court
recognized its responsibility under Macdonald Page to carry out a three-step analysis
in determining whether the new representation is substantially related to the subject
matter of the former representation. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253, at
4 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Feb. 1, 1995) (Bradford, J.). There is no indication in
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B.

Singer's Disqualification

The Law Court, in affirming Singer's disqualification, stated that

"[t]he language of ... [Rule] 3.4(b)(3)(i) is clear."' 09 The Law
Court reasoned that if Goldstein was disqualified, any lawyer affiliated with Goldstein also should be disqualified based on the presumption that the other lawyer would be privy to the confidential,
privileged information received by Goldstein. 10 The "clarity" of
the Law Court's interpretation of Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i), however, de-

pends upon its reliance on an unstated assumption: namely, that an
affiliation with a tainted lawyer at any time extends the taint to the
affiliated lawyer. The reading of this expansive temporal element
into Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i) is not mandated by the language of the Rule

and has been rejected as too restrictive by a number of jurisdictions
considering this question."1

its decision, however, that the requisite analysis was actually undertaken. In fact,
just prior to concluding "that the involvement of Goldstein in the creation of the
psychiatric hospital by CCSI, JBI and Associates was substantially related to the
matters now pending," id. at 5, the court merely recited Judge Weinfeld's "substantially related" test, which appears to beg the question:
Under the "substantially related" test, the former client need show no
more than that the matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his
former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substantially related
to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client.
Id. The Law Court's "highly deferential" review of the trial court's conclusion,
Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 859, failed to address the fact that even if
the trial court had ample evidence to conclude "that the prior representation was
substantially related to the pending litigation," id. at 860, the trial court did not set
out its findings under the Macdonald Page analysis.
Similarly, the fact that the trial court was "not persuaded that the right to move
for disqualification ha[d] been waived," Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., CV-93-1253,
at 6, was approved by the Law Court despite the trial court's lack of explanation for
its finding. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861. Again, the Law Court
merely deferred to the trial court's conclusion without looking for the lower court's
reasoning. Id. Consequently, there was no foundation upon which the Law Court
could reasonably determine whether the trial court's decision was -clearly
erroneous."
109. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861.
110. Id See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
111. The general rule of imputed disqualification under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly "operates only among the lawyers currently associated
in a firm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNoucr Rule 1.10 cmt. 6 (1994).
Under the Model Rules, Singer's situation would be governed by Model Rule 1.9,
Conflict of Interest: Former Client. Under Model Rule 1.9(b), Singer would be disqualified only if he actually had acquired confidential information while at Csaplar
& Bok. See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186, 197
(7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) ("[A] rote reliance on irrebuttable presumptions may deny
the courts the flexibility needed to reach a just and sensible ruling on ethical matters."); Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.)
(holding presumption "was dispelled by evidence that [the lawyer] saw none of the
files other than those ...[unrelated to the pending suit] and that he heard no [related] confidences" while at the former firm), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver
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Only by reading this expansive timing element into Rule 3.4
(b)(3)(i) could the Law Court fit Singer's involvement in JBI Associates under the imputed disqualification rule. Indeed, under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Singer's position would be
considered under the rule of former client conflict of interest. If the
Law Court had interpreted Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i) to have incorporated
Model Rule 1.10's introductory phrase, "while lawyers are associated in a firm," a different analysis of Singer's status would have
been mandated. The court would have to examine whether Singer's
representation was appropriate under the general successive conflict
of interest rule. This analysis would have given Singer the opportunity to rebut the presumption that he was in possession of any confidential information.
An examination of Maine Bar Rule 3.4(d)(1)(ii) illustrates the inequity of imputing Goldstein's disqualification to Singer with no opportunity for rebuttal."' Rule 3.4(d)(1)(ii) addresses a law firm's
duties when a new lawyer joins the firm. The Rule prohibits the
firm from representation adverse to a former client of the new lawyer only if the representation involves the same subject matter of
the previous representation or if the lawyer personally acquired material confidential information during the former employment. 1 3 If
Associates had hired another lawyer from Singer's present firm, the
Law Court presumably would have allowed inquiry into Singer's actual involvement in or knowledge of Csaplar & Bok's representation
of Associates, CCSI, and JBI. To deny the identical inquiry for
Singer himself by expansively reading the imputed disqualification
rule is inconsistent.
The Law Court also ruled that even if Maine's imputed disqualification rule allowed Singer the opportunity to show he possessed no
confidential information, "the other reasons supporting Rule
3.4(d)(3)(i)-client's expectations of loyalty, public perception of
Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975)
("[W]hile this Circuit has recognized that an inference may arise that an attorney
formerly associated with a firm himself received confidential information transmitted by a client to the firm, that inference is a rebuttable one.").
112. Maine Bar Rule 3.4(d)(1)(ii) reads:
(d) Conflict of Interest: Successive Representation.
(1) Interests of Former Clients

(ii) When a lawyer becomes affiliated with a firm, the firm shall not accept
or continue representation adverse to a former client of the lawyer, or the
lawyer's previous law firm, without that client's informed written consent,
if:
(A) Such representation involves the subject matter of former representation on which the lawyer personally worked; or
(B) The lawyer personally had acquired information protected by
[confidentiality rules] that is material to the new matter.
113. Id.
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the legal profession, and preservation of the integrity of the judici-

ary-would require Singer's disqualification.""

4

The Law Court's

implicit adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's "appearance of an impropriety" standard for attorney disqualification 1 5 goes against the modern practice of rejecting that
subjective standard for a more practical, fact-based inquiry." 6 The
Law Court offered no reason for denying this fact-based inquiry except to assert that "there is no room in [the] language [of Rule
3.4(b)(3)(i)] allowing Singer to rebut a presumption that he was

privy to privileged, confidential information." ' 7 This conclusion
again, however, is based on the challengeable assumption that the
rule deals with lawyers affiliated at any time. A different outcome

may have resulted if the rule was not read with any temporal
element." 8

C. Ramifications of the JBI Associates Decision
The Law Court's decision upholding the disqualification of Singer
occupies minimal space in the text of the JBIAssociates opinion, but
will have foreseeable and far reaching consequences. By adopting

the strict interpretation of Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i) that one lawyer's knowl114. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856, 861 (Me. 1995).
115. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSnILrrY

Canon 9 (1980) ("A Law-

yer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.").
116. The Model Rules explicitly reject the "appearance of impropriety" standard.
MODEL

RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.9 cmt. 5 (1994) (Under appear-

ance of impropriety, "disqualification would become little more than a question of
subjective judgment by the former client... [and] since impropriety' is undefined,
the term 'appearance of impropriety' is question-begging."). See also Waters v.
Kemp, 845 F.2d 260,265-66 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Under the Model Rules, the appearance of impropriety is not a ground for disqualifying a lawyer from representing a
party to a lawsuit."); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)
("appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order"); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)
(terming appearance of impropriety an "eye of the beholder" test), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978), overruled on jurisdictional grounds, 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.
1980); Bieter CO. v. Blomquist, 132 F.R.D. 220, 225 n.8 (D. Minn. 1990) (rejecting
the appearance of impropriety test and recognizing that the Model Rules were intended to substitute "clear concrete rules for the moralistic abstractions" of the
Model Code).
117. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861.
118. It is possible that Singer would have been disqualified from representing
Associates even if inquiry into his connection with the earlier representation was
undertaken. Although Associates claimed that Singer was completely unfamiliar
with Csaplar & Bok's work for CCSI, JBI, and Associates, Casco N. Bank v. JBI
Assocs., CV-93-1253, at 3 (Me. Super. CL, Cum. Cty., Feb. 1, 1995) (Bradford, J.),
CCSI alleged that its president, Thacher, met with Singer in Goldstein's office on
more than one occasion when matters relating to CCSI and JBI were being discussed. Brief of Appellees at 28, Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856 (Me.
1995) (No. CUM-95-149). The hearing, if allowed, may have resulted in a determination that Singer was indeed privy to confidential information.
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edge of a client's affairs should be irrebuttably presumed to have
been passed on to a former affiliate, the Law Court has accepted a
view that will lead to a number of hardships. Although Maine
avoids the "Typhoid Mary" problem, in which all of the lawyer's
prior law firm affiliations are imputed to the lawyer's new firm,119
the court's imputed disqualification rule still will restrict the options
of Maine's lawyers. As one commentator aptly described the
situation:
Suppose that a young litigator, now out on his own, was briefly
associated with a big firm and that the firm included among its
members a specialist in corporate law who once, perhaps
many years before, represented a client in some affair. The
young lawyer is now asked to represent a second client against
the first in a suit involving a substantially related matter. If
the firm is large enough, the corporate specialist may never
have been more than a name on the letterhead to the young
litigator, who was his nominal affiliate. In most instances, the
affiliate will not have been familiar with the corporate lawyer's
old client or with any of the details of that client's affairs during the affiliate's association with the firm. In this case, forbidding the young litigator's representation 'ofa second
client in a
120
suit against the first client is an empty gesture.
The strict imputation rule embraced by the Law Court constitutes
the sort of "empty gesture" that the above commentator cautioned
against. The rule needlessly restricts the scope of the lawyer's practice for the benefit of upholding the "public perception of the legal
profession,"' 12 1 a benefit which could be achieved more practically
by allowing a hearing into the lawyer's actual knowledge.
The strict rule adopted in JBI Associates also "imposes significant
losses on would-be clients, including effective deprivation of their
first choice of counsel.' 1 2 2 In addition to denying clients their pri119. "Typhoid Mary" situations occur when qualified lawyers are "shunned by
prospective ...employers because hiring them may result in the disqualification of
an entire firm in a possibly wide range of cases." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d
433, 443 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
Maine avoids this situation by disqualifying a lawyer's new firm only when the lawyer has previously received confidential information material to the present matter.
ME. BAR R. 3.4(d)(1)(ii). Nebraska is the only jurisdiction that has adopted the
strict imputation of a lawyer's prior affiliation to the present firm. See State ex rel.
Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 512 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 1994); State ex rel. FirsTier
Bank v. Buckley, 503 N.W.2d 838 (Neb. 1993). See also Haase, supra note 6; Andrew P. Romshek, Note, The Nebraska "Bright Line" Rule: The Automatic Disqualification of a Law Firm Due to a New Lawyer's or Nonlawyer's PriorAffiliations...
Sensible Solution or Serious Setback?, 28 CRIPIGIfroN L. REv. 213 (1994).
120. Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1356 (footnotes omitted). See also Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir.
1975).
121. Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d at 861.
122. Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1356.
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mary choice of counsel, this rule may result in substantial losses of
time and money for clients. For example, a lawyer formerly affiliated with a large firm may represent a current client, Client C, in
various legal matters. If a client of the lawyer's former firm, Client
F, subsequently sues Client C, it is conceivable that the lawyer may
commence representation without any knowledge that the opposing
party was a client of the former firm. In this case the lawyer may
complete substantial work at significant cost to Client C, yet still be
disqualified if Client F moves for disqualification based on the lawyer's past affiliations. Thus, through no fault of the lawyer, Client C
loses not only his counsel of choice, but suffers the time and cost of
hiring and bringing a new lawyer up to date with the case."
While Maine's legal community is relatively small, the increasing
number of attorneys in Maine' 2 4 and the tightening legal job market
will result in an increase in the frequency of circumstances such as
those encountered in JBIAssociates. The negative consequences resulting from the JBI Associates ruling were predicted by the American Bar Association:
[T]oday many lawyers practice in firms.... many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and ... many
move from one association to another several times in their
careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the
opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to
another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.' 5
The cost of the Law Court's imputed disqualification ruling in JBI
Associates does not fall only on attorneys and clients. The court's
decision rendering many more lawyers vulnerable to imputed disqualification rulings is likely to increase the number of disqualification motions presented to the courts. Parties now will have an
incentive to find any attenuated affiliation between an opposing
party's lawyer and their own action in order to gain the strategic
advantages of denying the opposition its first choice of counsel, delaying the process of litigation, and increasing the opponent's costs.
In our litigious society, there is likely to be an increase in the
number of motions brought solely for tactical reasons, rather than
on the legitimate basis of the protection of client confidences. This
outcome has been expressly recognized by a number of courts, 12 6

123. See Liebman, supra note 6, at 1000 n.20.
124. See supra note 1.
125. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.9 cmL 3 (1994).

126. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1984); Redd v. Shell Oil Co.,
518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Ferrante, 126 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr. D. Me.
1991); INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F.Supp 1199, 1203 (ED. Pa.

1984).
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including the Law Court.' 27 The Law Court's JBI Associates decision, rather than discouraging abuse of disqualification motions, is
an invitation to just such abuse.
D. Recommendations
In order to avoid the harsh consequences of the Law Court's interpretation of the imputed disqualification rule, Rule 3.4(b)(3)(i)
should be revised to clarify when it applies. The revision should indicate that the rule only applies when lawyers are currently affiliated. This is the approach adopted by the ABA in its Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. A proposed revision, with additions underlined, could be:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, if a lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from representation under these
rules for reasons other than health, no current partner or associate, and no lawyer presently affiliated with the lawyer or the
lawyer's firm, may commence or continue such representation.
This change would exempt lawyers in Singer's position from the imputed disqualification rule altogether. Client confidences then could
be protected by adding the equivalent of Model Rule 1.9(b) to
Maine's Conflict of Interest: Successive Representation guidelines.
Model Rule 1.9(b) addresses Singer's position directly:
A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same
or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the
lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a
client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person;
and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by [confidentiality rules] that is material to the
matter; unless the former client consents after
consultation. 2 8
Adoption of this rule would require a hearing to consider the propriety of representation in a case such as Singer's. This process
would protect the integrity of the judicial system while eliminating
the damaging costs of the strict imputation rule of JBI Associates.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Law Court's affirmance of the disqualification of Leonard
Singer in JBI Associates under the rule of imputed disqualification
127. Adam v. Macdonald Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461,464 (Me. 1994) ("'Lawyers
and litigants alike have caught on to the tactical advantage of disqualification motions, and some are not shy about using them anytime they think such a move will
advance their own interests.' (quoting ABAIBNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt §§ 51-206-07 (1994))).
128. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1994).
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created a number of problems. The court, instead of analyzing
Singer's present position, stretched Maine's imputed disqualification
rule to fit a situation that the rule was not meant to cover. In doing
so, the court has restricted lawyers' ability to represent clients who
desire their representation without gaining any practical benefit.
The Law Court will be able to protect the interests of the judicial
system, such as client confidentiality, while avoiding the harsh results of JBI Associates if it revises the Maine Bar Rules. The imputed disqualification rule should be amended to apply only to
lawyers presently affiliated and to require a factual determination of
whether a lawyer in Singer's position is in possession of any confidential information.
Michael J. Canavan

